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Abstract. We consider the problem of approximate reduction of non-determi-
nistic automata that appear in hardware-accelerated network intrusion detection
systems (NIDSes). We define an error distance of a reduced automaton from the
original one as the probability of packets being incorrectly classified by the re-
duced automaton (wrt the probabilistic distribution of packets in the network
traffic). We use this notion to design an approximate reduction procedure that
achieves a great size reduction (much beyond the state-of-the-art language pre-
serving techniques) with a controlled and small error. We have implemented our
approach and evaluated it on use cases from SNORT, a popular NIDS. Our results
provide experimental evidence that the method can be highly efficient in practice,
allowing NIDSes to follow the rapid growth in the speed of networks.
1 Introduction
The recent years have seen a boom in the number of security incidents in computer
networks. In order to alleviate the impact of network attacks and intrusions, Internet
providers want to detect malicious traffic at their network’s entry points and on the
backbones between sub-networks. Software-based network intrusion detection systems
(NIDSes), such as the popular open-source system SNORT [1], are capable of detecting
suspicious network traffic by testing (among others) whether a packet payload matches
a regular expression (regex) describing known patterns of malicious traffic. NIDSes
collect andmaintain vast databases of such regexes that are typically divided into groups
according to types of the attacks and target protocols.
Regex matching is the most computationally demanding task of a NIDS as its cost
grows with the speed of the network traffic as well as with the number and complexity
of the regexes being matched. The current software-based NIDSes cannot perform the
regex matching on networks beyond 1Gbps [2, 3], so they cannot handle the current
speed of backbone networks ranging between tens and hundreds of Gbps. A promising
approach to speed up NIDSes is to (partially) offload regex matching into hardware [3–
5]. The hardware then serves as a pre-filter of the network traffic, discarding the majority
of the packets from further processing. Such pre-filtering can easily reduce the traffic
the NIDS needs to handle by two or three orders of magnitude [3].
Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are the leading technology in high-
throughput regex matching. Due to their inherent parallelism, FPGAs provide an ef-
ficient way of implementing nondeterministic finite automata (NFAs), which natu-
rally arise from the input regexes. Although the amount of available resources in FP-
GAs is continually increasing, the speed of networks grows even faster. Working with
multi-gigabit networks requires the hardware to use many parallel packet processing
branches in a single FPGA [5]; each of them implementing a separate copy of the con-
cerned NFA, and so reducing the size of the NFAs is of the utmost importance. Various
language-preserving automata reduction approaches exist, mainly based on computing
(bi)simulation relations on automata states (cf. the related work). The reductions they
offer, however, do not satisfy the needs of high-speed hardware-accelerated NIDSes.
Our answer to the problem is approximate reduction of NFAs, allowing for a trade-
off between the achieved reduction and the precision of the regex matching. To for-
malise the intuitive notion of precision, we propose a novel probabilistic distance of
automata. It captures the probability that a packet of the input network traffic is incor-
rectly accepted or rejected by the approximated NFA. The distance assumes a proba-
bilistic model of the network traffic (we show later how such a model can be obtained).
Having formalised the notion of precision, we specify the target of our reductions
as two variants of an optimization problem: (1) minimizing the NFA size given the
maximum allowed error (distance from the original), or (2) minimizing the error given
the maximum allowed NFA size. Finding such optimal approximations is, however,
computationally hard (PSPACE-complete, the same as precise NFA minimization).
Consequently, we sacrifice the optimality and, motivated by the typical structure
of NFAs that emerge from a set of regexes used by NIDSes (a union of many long
“tentacles” with occasional small strongly-connected components), we limit the space
of possible reductions by restricting the set of operations they can apply to the original
automaton. Namely, we consider two reduction operations: (i) collapsing the future of
a state into a self-loop (this reduction over-approximates the language), or (ii) removing
states (such a reduction is under-approximating).
The problem of identifying the optimal sets of states on which these operations
should be applied is still PSPACE-complete. The restricted problem is, however, more
amenable to an approximation by a greedy algorithm. The algorithm applies the re-
ductions state-by-state in an order determined by a precomputed error labelling of the
states. The process is stoppped once the given optimization goal in terms of the size or
error is reached. The labelling is based on the probability of packets that may be ac-
cepted through a given state and hence over-approximates the error that may be caused
by applying the reduction at a given state. As our experiments show, this approach can
give us high-quality reductions while ensuring formal error bounds.
Finally, it turns out that even the pre-computation of the error labelling of the states
is costly (again PSPACE-complete). Therefore, we propose several ways to cheaply
over-approximate it such that the strong error bound guarantees are still preserved. Par-
ticularly, we are able to exploit the typical structure of the “union of tentacles” of the
hardware NFA in an algorithm that is exponential in the size of the largest “tentacle”
only, which is indeed much faster in practice.
We have implemented our approach and evaluated it on regexes used to classify ma-
licious traffic in SNORT. We obtain quite encouraging experimental results demonstrat-
ing that our approach provides a much better reduction than language-preserving tech-
niques with an almost negligible error. In particular, our experiments, going down to the
level of an actual implementation of NFAs in FPGAs, confirm that we can squeeze into
an up-to-date FPGA chip real-life regexes encoding malicious traffic, allowing them to
be used with a negligible error for filtering at speeds of 100Gbps (and even 400Gbps).
This is far beyond what one can achieve with current exact reduction approaches.
RelatedWork Hardware acceleration for regexmatching at the line rate is an intensively
studied technology that uses general-purpose hardware [6–14] as well as FPGAs [15–
20, 3–5]. Most of the works focus on DFA implementation and optimization techniques.
NFAs can be exponentially smaller than DFAs but need, in the worst case, O(n) mem-
ory accesses to process each byte of the payload where n is the number of states. In
most cases, this incurs an unacceptable slowdown. Several works alleviate this disad-
vantage of NFAs by exploiting reconfigurability and fine-grained parallelism of FPGAs,
allowing one to process one character per clock cycle (e.g. [15, 16, 19, 20, 3–5]).
In [14], which is probably the closest work to ours, the authors consider a set of
regexes describing network attacks. They replace a potentially prohibitively large DFA
by a tree of smaller DFAs, an alternative to using NFAs that minimizes the latency
occurring in a non-FPGA-based implementation. The language of every DFA-node in
the tree over-approximates the languages of its children. Packets are filtered through
the tree from the root downwards until they belong to the language of the encoun-
tered nodes, and may be finally accepted at the leaves, or are rejected otherwise. The
over-approximating DFAs are constructed using a similar notion of probability of an
occurrence of a state as in our approach. The main differences from our work are that
(1) the approach targets approximation of DFAs (not NFAs), (2) the over-approximation
is based on a given traffic sample only (it cannot benefit from a probabilistic model),
and (3) no probabilistic guarantees on the approximation error are provided.
Approximation of DFAs was considered in various other contexts. Hyper-minimi-
zation is an approach that is allowed to alter language membership of a finite set of
words [21, 22]. A DFA with a given maximum number of states is constructed in [23],
minimizing the error defined either by (i) counting prefixes of misjudged words up
to some length, or (ii) the sum of the probabilities of the misjudged words wrt the
Poisson distribution overΣ∗. Neither of these approaches considers reduction of NFAs
nor allows to control the expected error with respect to the real traffic.
In addition to the metrics mentioned above when discussing the works [23, 21, 22],
the following metrics should also be mentioned. The Cesaro-Jaccard distance studied
in [24] is, in spirit, similar to [23] and does also not reflect the probability of individual
words. The edit distance of weighted automata from [25] depends on the minimum edit
distance between pairs of words from the two compared languages, again regardless of
their statistical significance. None of these notions is suitable for our needs.
Language-preserving minimization of NFAs is a PSPACE-complete problem [26,
27]. More feasible (polynomial-time) is language-preserving size reduction of NFAs
based on (bi)simulations [28–31], which does not aim for a truly minimal NFA. A num-
ber of advanced variants exist, based on multi-pebble or look-ahead simulations, or on
combinations of forward and backward simulations [32–34]. The practical efficiency of
these techniques is, however, often insufficient to allow them to handle the large NFAs
that occur in practice and/or they do not manage to reduce the NFAs enough. Finally,
even a minimal NFA for the given set of regexes is often too big to be implemented in
the given FPGA operating on the required speed (as shown even in our experiments).
Our approach is capable of a much better reduction for the price of a small change of
the accepted language.
2 Preliminaries
We use 〈a, b〉 to denote the set {x ∈ R | a ≤ x ≤ b} and N to denote the set
{0, 1, 2, . . .}. Given a pair of setsX1 andX2, we useX1△X2 to denote their symmet-
ric difference, i.e., the set {x | ∃!i ∈ {1, 2} : x ∈ Xi}. We use the notation [v1, . . . , vn]
to denote a vector of n elements, 1 to denote the all 1’s vector [1, . . . , 1], A to denote
a matrix, andA⊤ for its transpose, and I for the identity matrix.
In the following, we fix a finite non-empty alphabet Σ. A nondeterministic finite
automaton (NFA) is a quadruple A = (Q, δ, I, F ) where Q is a finite set of states,
δ : Q × Σ → 2Q is a transition function, I ⊆ Q is a set of initial states, and F ⊆ Q
is a set of accepting states. We useQ[A], δ[A], I[A], and F [A] to denoteQ, δ, I , and F ,
respectively, and q
a
−→ q′ to denote that q′ ∈ δ(q, a). A sequence of states ρ = q0 · · · qn
is a run of A over a word w = a1 · · · an ∈ Σ∗ from a state q to a state q′, denoted as
q
w,ρ
 q′, if ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : qi−1
ai−→ qi, q0 = q, and qn = q′. Sometimes, we use ρ in set
operations where it behaves as the set of states it contains. We also use q
w
 q′ to denote
that ∃ρ ∈ Q∗ : q
w,ρ
 q′ and q  q′ to denote that ∃w : q
w
 q′. The language of a state q
is defined as LA(q) = {w | ∃qF ∈ F : q
w
 qF } and its banguage (back-language) is
defined as L♭A(q) = {w | ∃qI ∈ I : qI
w
 q}. Both notions can be naturally extended to
a set S ⊆ Q: LA(S) =
⋃
q∈S LA(q) and L
♭
A(S) =
⋃
q∈S L
♭
A(q). We drop the subscript
Awhen the context is obvious.A accepts the languageL(A) defined asL(A) = LA(I).
A is called deterministic (DFA) if |I| = 1 and ∀q ∈ Q and ∀a ∈ Σ : |δ(q, a)| ≤ 1, and
unambiguous (UFA) if ∀w ∈ L(A) : ∃!qI ∈ I, ρ ∈ Q∗, qF ∈ F : qI
w,ρ
 qF .
The restriction of A to S ⊆ Q is an NFA A|S given as A|S = (S, δ ∩ (S × Σ ×
2S), I ∩ S, F ∩ S). We define the trim operation as trim(A) = A|C where C = {q |
∃qI ∈ I, qF ∈ F : qI  q  qF }. For a set of states R ⊆ Q, we use reach(R) to
denote the set of states reachable from R, formally, reach(R) = {r′ | ∃r ∈ R : r  
r′}. We use the number of states as the measurement of the size of A, i.e., |A| = |Q|.
A (discrete probability) distribution over a setX is a mappingPr : X → 〈0, 1〉 such
that
∑
x∈X Pr(x) = 1. An n-state probabilistic automaton (PA) overΣ is a triple P =
(α,γ, {∆a}a∈Σ) whereα ∈ 〈0, 1〉n is a vector of initial weights, γ ∈ 〈0, 1〉n is a vec-
tor of final weights, and for every a ∈ Σ,∆a ∈ 〈0, 1〉
n×n is a transition matrix for sym-
bol a. We abuse notation and use Q[P ] to denote the set of states Q[P ] = {1, . . . , n}.
Moreover, the following two properties need to hold: (i)
∑
{α[i] | i ∈ Q[P ]} = 1 (the
initial probability is 1) and (ii) for every state i ∈ Q[P ] it holds that
∑
{∆a[i, j] | j ∈
Q[P ], a ∈ Σ}+γ[i] = 1 (the probability of accepting or leaving a state is 1). We define
the support of P as the NFA supp(P ) = (Q[P ], δ[P ], I[P ], F [P ]) s.t.
δ[P ] = {(i, a, j) |∆a[i, j] > 0} I[P ] = {i | α[i] > 0} F [P ] = {i | γ[i] > 0}.
Let us assume that every PA P is such that supp(P ) = trim(supp(P )). For a wordw =
a1 . . . ak ∈ Σ∗, we use∆w to denote the matrix∆a1 · · ·∆ak . It can be easily shown
that P represents a distribution over words w ∈ Σ∗ defined as PrP (w) = α⊤ ·∆w ·γ.
We call PrP (w) the probability of w in P . Given a language L ⊆ Σ∗, we define the
probability of L in P as PrP (L) =
∑
w∈L PrP (w).
If Conditions (i) and (ii) from the definition of PAs are dropped, we speak about
a pseudo-probabilistic automaton (PPA), which may assign a word from its support
a quantity that is not necessarily in the range 〈0, 1〉, denoted as the significance of the
word below. PPAs may arise during some of our operations performed on PAs.
3 Approximate Reduction of NFAs
In this section, we first introduce the key notion of our approach: a probabilistic dis-
tance of a pair of finite automata wrt a given probabilistic automaton that, intuitively,
represents the significance of particular words. We discuss the complexity of computing
the probabilistic distance. Finally, we formulate two problems of approximate automata
reduction via probabilistic distance.
3.1 Probabilistic Distance
We start by defining our notion of a probabilistic distance of two NFAs. Assume NFAs
A1 and A2 and a probabilistic automaton P specifying the distribution PrP : Σ
∗ →
〈0, 1〉. The probabilistic distance dP (A1, A2) betweenA1 andA2 wrtPrP is defined as
dP (A1, A2) = PrP (L(A1)△L(A2)).
Intuitively, the distance captures the significance of the words accepted by one of the
automata only. We use the distance to drive the reduction process towards automata
with small errors and to assess the quality of the resulting automata.
The value of PrP (L(A1)△L(A2)) can be computed as follows. Using the fact that
(1) L1△L2 = (L1 \ L2)⊎(L2 \ L1) and (2) L1 \ L2 = L1 \ (L1 ∩ L2), we get
dP (A1, A2) = PrP (L(A1) \ L(A2)) + PrP (L(A2) \ L(A1))
= PrP (L(A1) \ (L(A1) ∩ L(A2))) + PrP (L(A2) \ (L(A2) ∩ L(A1)))
= PrP (L(A1)) + PrP (L(A2))− 2 · PrP (L(A1) ∩ L(A2)).
Hence, the key step is to computePrP (L(A)) for an NFAA and a PA P . Problems sim-
ilar to computing such a probability have been extensively studied in several contexts
including verification of probabilistic systems [35–37]. The below lemma summarises
the complexity of this step.
Lemma 1. Let P be a PA and A an NFA. The problem of computing PrP (L(A)) is
PSPACE-complete. For a UFA A, PrP (L(A)) can be computed in PTIME.
In our approach, we apply the method of [37] and compute PrP (L(A)) in the fol-
lowing way. We first check whether the NFA A is unambiguous. This can be done by
using the standard product construction (denoted as ∩) for computing the intersection
of the NFA A with itself and trimming the result, formally B = trim(A ∩ A), fol-
lowed by a check whether there is some state (p, q) ∈ Q[B] s.t. p 6= q [38]. If A is
ambiguous, we either determinise it or disambiguate it [38], leading to a DFA/UFA A′,
respectively.1 Then, we construct the trimmed product of A′ and P (this can be seen
as computing A′ ∩ supp(P ) while keeping the probabilities from P on the edges of
the result), yielding a PPA R = (α,γ, {∆a}a∈Σ).
2 Intuitively, R represents not only
the words of L(A) but also their probability in P . Now, let ∆ =
∑
a∈Σ∆a be the
1 In theory, disambiguation can produce smaller automata, but, in our experiments, determinisa-
tion proved to work better.
2 R is not necessarily a PA since there might be transitions in P that are either removed or
copied several times in the product construction.
matrix that expresses, for any p, q ∈ Q[R], the significance of getting from p to q via
any a ∈ Σ. Further, it can be shown (cf. the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix) that
the matrix∆∗, representing the significance of going from p to q via any w ∈ Σ∗, can
be computed as (I −∆)−1. Then, to get PrP (L(A)), it suffices to take α⊤ ·∆
∗ · γ.
Note that, due to the determinisation/disambiguation step, the obtained value indeed is
PrP (L(A)) despite R being a PPA.
3.2 Automata Reduction using Probabilistic Distance
We now exploit the above introduced probabilistic distance to formulate the task of
approximate reduction of NFAs as the following two optimisation problems. Given
an NFA A and a PA P specifying the distribution PrP : Σ
∗ → 〈0, 1〉, we define
– size-driven reduction: for n ∈ N, find an NFA A′ such that |A′| ≤ n and the
distance dP (A,A
′) is minimal,
– error-driven reduction: for ǫ ∈ 〈0, 1〉, find an NFA A′ such that dP (A,A
′) ≤ ǫ
and the size |A′| is minimal.
The following lemma shows that the natural decision problem underlying both of the
above optimization problems is PSPACE-complete, which matches the complexity of
computing the probabilistic distance as well as that of the exact reduction of NFAs [26].
Lemma 2. Consider an NFA A, a PA P , a bound on the number of states n ∈ N, and
an error bound ǫ ∈ 〈0, 1〉. It is PSPACE-complete to determine whether there exists
an NFA A′ with n states s.t. dP (A,A
′) ≤ ǫ.
The notions defined above do not distinguish between introducing a false positive
(A′ accepts a wordw /∈ L(A)) or a false negative (A′ does not accept a wordw ∈ L(A))
answers. To this end, we define over-approximating and under-approximating reduc-
tions as reductions for which the additional conditions L(A) ⊆ L(A′) and L(A) ⊇
L(A′) hold, respectively.
A naı¨ve solution to the reductions would enumerate all NFAs A′ of sizes from 0
up to k (resp. |A|), for each of them compute dP (A,A′), and take an automaton with
the smallest probabilistic distance (resp. a smallest one satisfying the restriction on
dP (A,A
′)). Obviously, this approach is computationally infeasible.
4 A Heuristic Approach to Approximate Reduction
In this section, we introduce two techniques for approximate reduction of NFAs that
avoid the need to iterate over all automata of a certain size. The first approach under-
approximates the automata by removing states—we call it the pruning reduction—
while the second approach over-approximates the automata by adding self-loops to
states and removing redundant states—we call it the self-loop reduction. Finding an op-
timal automaton using these reductions is also PSPACE-complete, but more amenable
to heuristics like greedy algorithms.We start with introducing two high-level greedy al-
gorithms, one for the size- and one for the error-driven reduction, and follow by showing
their instantiations for the pruning and the self-loop reduction. A crucial role in the al-
gorithms is played by a function that labels states of the automata by an estimate of the
error that will be caused when some of the reductions is applied at a given state.
4.1 A General Algorithm for Size-Driven Reduction
Algorithm 1: A greedy size-driven reduction
Input : NFA A = (Q, δ, I, F ), PA P , n ≥ 1
Output: NFA A′, ǫ ∈ R s.t. |A| ≤ n and
dP (A,A
′) ≤ ǫ
1 V ← ∅;
2 for q ∈ Q in the order A,label(A,P ) do
3 V ← V ∪ {q}; A′ ← reduce(A, V );
4 if |A′| ≤ n then break ;
5 return A′, ǫ = error(A, V, label (A,P ));
Algorithm 1 shows a general greedy
method for performing the size-
driven reduction. In order to use the
same high-level algorithm in both
directions of reduction (over/under-
approximating), it is parameterized
with three functions: label , reduce,
and error . The real intricacy of
the procedure is hidden inside
these three functions. Intuitively,
label (A,P ) assigns every state of an NFA A an approximation of the error that will
be caused wrt the PA P when a reduction is applied at this state, while the purpose
of reduce(A, V ) is to create a new NFA A′ obtained from A by introducing some er-
ror at states from V .3 Further, error (A, V, label (A,P )) estimates the error introduced
by the application of reduce(A, V ), possibly in a more precise (and costly) way than
by just summing the concerned error labels: Such a computation is possible outside of
the main computation loop. We show instantiations of these functions later, when dis-
cussing the reductions used. Moreover, the algorithm is also parameterized with a total
order A,label(A,P ) that defines which states of A are processed first and which are
processed later. The ordering may take into account the precomputed labelling. The
algorithm accepts an NFA A, a PA P , and n ∈ N and outputs a pair consisting of
an NFA A′ of the size |A′| ≤ n and an error bound ǫ such that dP (A,A
′) ≤ ǫ.
The main idea of the algorithm is that it creates a set V of states where an error is to
be introduced. V is constructed by starting from an empty set and adding states to it in
the order given byA,label(A,P ), until the size of the result of reduce(A, V ) has reached
the desired bound n (in our setting, reduce is always antitone, i.e., for V ⊆ V ′, it holds
that |reduce(A, V )| ≥ |reduce(A, V ′)|). We now define the necessary condition for
label , reduce, and error that makes Algorithm 1 correct.
Condition C1 holds if for every NFA A, PA P , and a set V ⊆ Q[A], we have that
(a) error(A, V, label (A,P )) ≥ dP (A, reduce(A, V )), (b) |reduce(A,Q[A])| ≤ 1, and
(c) reduce(A, ∅) = A.
C1(a) ensures that the error computed by the reduction algorithm indeed over-
approximates the exact probabilistic distance, C1(b) ensures that the algorithm can (in
the worst case, by applying the reduction at every state of A) for any n ≥ 1 output a re-
sult |A′| of the size |A′| ≤ n, and C1(c) ensures that when no error is to be introduced
at any state, we obtain the original automaton.
Lemma 3. Algorithm 1 is correct if C1 holds.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from Condition C1. ⊓⊔
3 We emphasize that this does not mean that states from V will be simply removed fromA—the
performed operation depends on the particular reduction.
4.2 A General Algorithm for Error-Driven Reduction
Algorithm 2: A greedy error-driven reduction.
Input :NFA A = (Q, δ, I, F ), PA P , ǫ ∈ 〈0, 1〉
Output: NFA A′ s.t. dP (A,A
′) ≤ ǫ
1 ℓ← label(A,P );
2 V ← ∅;
3 for q ∈ Q in the order A,label(A,P ) do
4 e← error(A, V ∪ {q}, ℓ);
5 if e ≤ ǫ then V ← V ∪ {q} ;
6 return A′ = reduce(A, V );
In Algorithm 2, we provide
a high-level method of com-
puting the error-driven reduc-
tion. The algorithm is in many
ways similar to Algorithm 1;
it also computes a set of
states V where an error is to be
introduced, but an important dif-
ference is that we compute an ap-
proximation of the error in each
step and only add q to V if it does not raise the error over the threshold ǫ. Note that
the error does not need to be monotone, so it may be advantageous to traverse all
states fromQ and not terminate as soon as the threshold is reached. The correctness of
Algorithm 2 also depends on C1.
Lemma 4. Algorithm 2 is correct if C1 holds.
Proof. Follows straightforwardly from Condition C1. ⊓⊔
4.3 Pruning Reduction
The pruning reduction is based on identifying a set of states to be removed from an
NFA A, under-approximating the language ofA. In particular, forA = (Q, δ, I, F ), the
pruning reduction finds a set R ⊆ Q and restricts A to Q \ R, followed by removing
useless states, to construct a reduced automaton A′ = trim(A|Q\R). Note that the
natural decision problem corresponding to this reduction is also PSPACE-complete.
Lemma 5. Consider an NFA A, a PA P , a bound on the number of states n ∈ N, and
an error bound ǫ ∈ 〈0, 1〉. It is PSPACE-complete to determine whether there exists
a subset of states R ⊆ Q[A] of the size |R| = n such that dP (A,A|R) ≤ ǫ.
Although Lemma 5 shows that the pruning reduction is as hard as a general reduc-
tion (cf. Lemma 2), the pruning reduction is more amenable to the use of heuristics like
the greedy algorithms from §4.1 and §4.2. We instantiate reduce, error , and label in
these high-level algorithms in the following way (the subscript p means pruning):
reducep(A, V ) = trim(A|Q\V ), errorp(A, V, ℓ) = min
V ′∈⌊V ⌋p
∑
{ℓ(q) | q ∈ V ′} ,
where ⌊V ⌋p is defined as follows. Because of the use of trim in reducep, for a pair
of sets V, V ′ s.t. V ⊂ V ′, it holds that reducep(A, V ) may, in general, yield the same
automaton as reducep(A, V
′). Hence, we define a partial order ⊑p on 2Q as V1 ⊑p V2
iff reducep(A, V1) = reducep(A, V2) and V1 ⊆ V2, and use ⌊V ⌋p to denote the set
of minimal elements wrt V and ⊑p. The value of the approximation errorp(A, V, ℓ) is
therefore the minimum of the sum of errors over all sets from ⌊V ⌋p.
Note that the size of ⌊V ⌋p can again be exponential, and thus we employ a greedy
approach for guessing an optimal V ′. Clearly, this cannot affect the soundness of the
algorithm, but only decreases the precision of the bound on the distance. Our experi-
ments indicate that for automata appearing in NIDSes, this simplification has typically
only a negligible impact on the precision of the bounds.
For computing the state labelling, we provide the following three functions, which
differ in the precision they provide and the difficulty of their computation (naturally,
more precise labellings are harder to compute): label1p, label
2
p, and label
3
p. Given an
NFA A and a PA P , they generate the labellings ℓ1p, ℓ
2
p, and ℓ
3
p, respectively, defined as
ℓ1p(q) =
∑{
PrP (L
♭
A(q
′))
∣∣∣ q′ ∈ reach({q}) ∩ F} ,
ℓ2p(q) = PrP
(
L♭A(F ∩ reach(q))
)
, ℓ3p(q) = PrP
(
L♭A(q).LA(q)
)
.
A state label ℓ(q) approximates the error of the words removed from L(A) when q
is removed. More concretely, ℓ1p(q) is a rough estimate saying that the error can be
bounded by the sum of probabilities of the banguages of all final states reachable from q
(in the worst case, all those final states might become unreachable). Note that ℓ1p(q)
(1) counts the error of a word accepted in two different final states of reach(q) twice,
and (2) also considers words that are accepted in some final state in reach(q) without
going through q. The labelling ℓ2p deals with (1) by computing the total probability of the
banguage of the set of all final states reachable from q, and the labelling ℓ3p in addition
also deals with (2) by only considering words that traverse through q (they can still be
accepted in some final state not in reach(q) though, so even ℓ3p is still imprecise). Note
that if A is unambiguous then ℓ1p = ℓ
2
p.
When computing the label of q, we first modify A to obtain A′ accepting the lan-
guage related to the particular labelling. Then, we compute the value of PrP (L(A
′))
using the algorithm from §3.1. Recall that this step is in general costly, due to the deter-
minisation/disambiguation ofA′. The key property of the labelling computation resides
in the fact that if A is composed of several disjoint sub-automata, the automaton A′ is
typically much smaller thanA and thus the computation of the label is considerable less
demanding. Since the automata appearing in regex matching for NIDS are composed
of the union of “tentacles”, the particular A′s are very small, which enables efficient
component-wise computation of the labels.
The following lemma states the correctness of using the pruning reduction as an
instantiation of Algorithms 1 and 2 and also the relation among ℓ1p, ℓ
2
p, and ℓ
3
p.
Lemma 6. For every x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the functions reducep, errorp, and label
x
p sat-
isfy C1. Moreover, consider an NFA A, a PA P , and let ℓxp = label
x
p(A,P ) for x ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Then, for each q ∈ Q[A], we have ℓ1p(q) ≥ ℓ
2
p(q) ≥ ℓ
3
p(q).
4.4 Self-loop Reduction
The main idea of the self-loop reduction is to over-approximate the language of A by
adding self-loops over every symbol at selected states. This makes some states of A
redundant, allowing them to be removed without introducing any more error. Given
an NFA A = (Q, δ, I, F ), the self-loop reduction searches for a set of states R ⊆ Q,
which will have self-loops added, and removes other transitions leading out of these
states, making some states unreachable. The unreachable states are then removed.
Formally, let sl(A,R) be the NFA (Q, δ′, I, F ) whose transition function δ′ is de-
fined, for all p ∈ Q and a ∈ Σ, as δ′(p, a) = {p} if p ∈ R and δ′(p, a) = δ(p, a)
otherwise. As with the pruning reduction, the natural decision problem corresponding
to the self-loop reduction is also PSPACE-complete.
Lemma 7. Consider an NFA A, a PA P , a bound on the number of states n ∈ N, and
an error bound ǫ ∈ 〈0, 1〉. It is PSPACE-complete to determine whether there exists
a subset of states R ⊆ Q[A] of the size |R| = n such that dP (A, sl(A,R)) ≤ ǫ.
The required functions in the error- and size-driven reduction algorithms are instan-
tiated in the following way (the subcript sl means self-loop):
reducesl (A, V ) = trim(sl (A, V )), error sl (A, V, ℓ) =
∑
{ℓ(q) | q ∈ min (⌊V ⌋sl )} ,
where ⌊V ⌋sl is defined in a similar manner as ⌊V ⌋p in the previous section (using
a partial order ⊑sl defined similarly to ⊑p; in this case, the order ⊑sl has a single
minimal element, though).
The functions label1sl , label
2
sl , and label
3
sl compute the state labellings ℓ
1
sl , ℓ
2
sl , and ℓ
3
sl
for an NFA A and a PA P defined as follows:
ℓ1sl(q) = weightP (L
♭
A(q)), ℓ
2
sl (q) = PrP
(
L♭A(q).Σ
∗
)
,
ℓ3sl(q) = ℓ
2
sl(q)− PrP
(
L♭A(q).LA(q)
)
.
Above, weightP (w) for a PA P = (α,γ, {∆a}a∈Σ) and a word w ∈ Σ
∗ is defined as
weightP (w) = α
⊤ ·∆w · 1 (i.e., similarly as PrP (w) but with the final weights γ dis-
carded), andweightP (L) forL ⊆ Σ
∗ is defined as weightP (L) =
∑
w∈L weightP (w).
Intuitively, the state labelling ℓ1sl(q) computes the probability that q is reached from
an initial state, so if q is pumped up with all possible word endings, this is the maximum
possible error introduced by the added word endings. This has the following sources
of imprecision: (1) the probability of some words may be included twice, e.g., when
L♭A(q) = {a, ab}, the probabilities of all words from {ab}.Σ
∗ are included twice in
ℓ1sl(q) because {ab}.Σ
∗ ⊆ {a}.Σ∗, and (2) ℓ1sl(q) can also contain probabilities of
words that are already accepted on a run traversing q. The state labelling ℓ2sl deals with
(1) by considering the probability of the languageL♭A(q).Σ
∗, and ℓ3sl deals also with (2)
by subtracting from the result of ℓ2sl the probabilities of the words that pass through q
and are accepted.
The computation of the state labellings for the self-loop reduction is done in a sim-
ilar way as the computation of the state labellings for the pruning reduction (cf. §4.3).
For a computation of weightP (L) one can use the same algorithm as for PrP (L), only
the final vector for PA P is set to 1. The correctness of Algorithms 1 and 2 when in-
stantiated using the self-loop reduction is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. For every x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the functions reducesl , error sl , and label
x
sl sat-
isfy C1. Moreover, consider an NFA A, a PA P , and let ℓxsl = label
x
sl (A,P ) for x ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Then, for each q ∈ Q[A], we have ℓ1sl(q) ≥ ℓ
2
sl(q) ≥ ℓ
3
sl (q).
5 Reduction of NFAs in Network Intrusion Detection Systems
We have implemented our approach in a Python prototype named APPREAL (APProx-
imate REduction of Automata and Languages)4 and evaluated it on the use case of net-
work intrusion detection using SNORT [1], a popular open source NIDS. The version of
APPREAL used for the evaluation in the current paper is available as an artifact [39] for
the TACAS’18 artifact virtual machine [40].
4 https://github.com/vhavlena/appreal/tree/tacas18
5.1 Network Traffic Model
The reduction we describe in this paper is driven by a probabilistic model representing
a distribution overΣ∗, and the formal guarantees are also wrt this model. We use learn-
ing to obtain a model of network traffic over the 8-bit ASCII alphabet at a given network
point. Our model is created from several gigabytes of network traffic from a measuring
point of the CESNET Internet provider connected to a 100Gbps backbone link (unfor-
tunately, we cannot provide the traffic dump since it may contain sensitive data).
Learning a PA representing the network traffic faithfully is hard. The PA cannot be
too specific—although the number of different packets that can occur is finite, it is still
extremely large (a conservative estimate assuming the most common scenario Ether-
net/IPv4/TCP would still yield a number over 210,000). If we assigned non-zero proba-
bilities only to the packets from the dump (which are less than 220), the obtained model
would completely ignore virtually all packets that might appear on the network, and,
moreover, the model would also be very large (millions of states), making it difficult to
use in our algorithms. A generalization of the obtained traffic is therefore needed.
A natural solution is to exploit results from the area of PA learning, such as [41, 42].
Indeed, we experimented with the use of ALERGIA [41], a learning algorithm that con-
structs a PA from a prefix tree (where edges are labelled with multiplicities) by merging
nodes that are “similar.” The automata that we obtained were, however, too general. In
particular, the constructed automata destroyed the structure of network protocols—the
merging was too permissive and the generalization merged distant states, which intro-
duced loops over a very large substructure in the automaton (such a case usually does
not correspond to the design of network protocols). As a result, the obtained PA more
or less represented the Poisson distribution, having essentially no value for us.
In §5.2, we focus on the detection of malicious traffic transmitted over HTTP. We
take advantage of this fact and create a PA representing the traffic while taking into
account the structure of HTTP. We start by manually creating a DFA that represents the
high-level structure of HTTP. Then, we proceed by feeding 34,191 HTTP packets from
our sample into the DFA, at the same time taking notes about how many times every
state is reached and how many times every transition is taken. The resulting PA PHTTP
(of 52 states) is then obtained from the DFA and the labels in the obvious way.
The described method yields automata that are much better than those obtained
using ALERGIA in our experiments. A disadvantage of the method is that it is only
semi-automatic—the basic DFA needed to be provided by an expert. We have yet to
find an algorithm that would suit our needs for learning more general network traffic.
5.2 Evaluation
We start this section by introducing the experimental setting, namely, the integration of
our reduction techniques into the tool chain implementing efficient regex matching, the
concrete settings of APPREAL, and the evaluation environment. Afterwards, we discuss
the results evaluating the quality of the obtained approximate reductions as well as of
the provided error bounds. Finally, we present the performance of our approach and
discuss its key aspects. Due to the lack of space, we selected the most interesting results
demonstrating the potential as well as the limitations of our approach.
General setting. SNORT detects malicious network traffic based on rules that con-
tain conditions. The conditions may take into consideration, among others, network ad-
dresses, ports, or Perl compatible regular expressions (PCREs) that the packet payload
should match. In our evaluation, we always select a subset of SNORT rules, extract the
PCREs from them, and use NETBENCH [20] to transform them into a single NFAA. Be-
fore applying APPREAL, we use the state-of-the-art NFA reduction tool REDUCE [43]
to decrease the size ofA. REDUCE performs a language-preserving reduction ofA using
advanced variants of simulation [32] (in the experiment reported in Table 3, we skip the
use of REDUCE at this step as discussed in the performance evaluation). The automaton
ARED obtained as the result of REDUCE is the input of APPREAL, which performs one of
the approximate reductions from §4 wrt the traffic model PHTTP , yielding A
APP . After
the approximate reduction, we, one more time, use REDUCE and obtain the result A′.
Settings of APPREAL. In the use case of NIDS pre-filtering, it may be important to
never introduce a false negative, i.e., to never drop a malicious packet. Therefore, we
focus our evaluation on the self-loop reduction (§4.4). In particular, we use the state la-
belling function label2sl , since it provides a good trade-off between the precision and the
computational demands (recall that the computation of label2sl can exploit the “tentacle”
structure of the NFAs we work with). We give more attention to the size-driven reduc-
tion (§4.1) since, in our setting, a bound on the available FPGA resources is typically
given and the task is to create an NFA with the smallest error that fits inside. The order
A,ℓ2
sl
over states used in §4.1 and §4.2 is defined as s A,ℓ2
sl
s′ ⇔ ℓ2sl(s) ≤ ℓ
2
sl(s
′).
Evaluation environment. All experiments run on a 64-bit LINUX DEBIAN worksta-
tion with the Intel Core(TM) i5-661 CPU running at 3.33GHz with 16GiB of RAM.
Description of tables. In the caption of every table, we provide the name of the input
file (in the directoryregexps/tacas18/ of the repository of APPREAL) with the se-
lection of SNORT regexes used in the particular experiment, together with the type of the
reduction (size- or error-driven). All reductions are over-approximating (self-loop re-
duction).We further provide the size of the input automaton |A|, the size after the initial
processing by REDUCE (|ARED |), and the time of this reduction (time(REDUCE)). Fi-
nally, we list the times of computing the state labelling label2sl onA
RED (time(label2sl )),
the exact probabilistic distance (time(Exact)), and also the number of look-up tables
(LUTs(ARED)) consumed on the targeted FPGA (Xilinx Virtex 7 H580T) when ARED
was synthesized (more on this in §5.3). The meaning of the columns in the tables is the
following:
k/ǫ is the parameter of the reduction. In particular, k is used for the size-driven reduc-
tion and denotes the desired reduction ration k = n|ARED| for an input NFA A
RED and
the desired size of the output n. On the other hand, ǫ is the desired maximum error
on the output for the error-driven reduction.
|AAPP| shows the number of states of the automaton AAPP after the reduction by AP-
PREAL and the time the reduction took (we omit it when it is not interesting).
|A′| contains the number of states of the NFA A′ obtained after applying REDUCE on
AAPP and the time used by REDUCE at this step (omitted when not interesting).
Error bound shows the estimation of the error of A′ as determined by the reduction
itself, i.e., it is the probabilistic distance computed by the function error in §4.
Table 1: Results for the http-malicious regex, |Amal| = 249, |AREDmal | = 98,
time(REDUCE) = 3.5 s, time(label2sl ) = 38.7 s, time(Exact) = 3.8–6.5 s, and
LUTs(AREDmal) = 382.
(a) size-driven reduction
Error Exact Traffic
k |AAPPmal| |A
′
mal| bound error error LUTs
0.1 9 (0.65 s) 9 (0.4 s) 0.0704 0.0704 0.0685 —
0.2 19 (0.66 s) 19 (0.5 s) 0.0677 0.0677 0.0648 —
0.3 29 (0.69 s) 26 (0.9 s) 0.0279 0.0278 0.0598 154
0.4 39 (0.68 s) 36 (1.1 s) 0.0032 0.0032 0.0008 —
0.5 49 (0.68 s) 44 (1.4 s) 2.8e-05 2.8e-05 4.1e-06 —
0.6 58 (0.69 s) 49 (1.7 s) 8.7e-08 8.7e-08 0.0 224
0.8 78 (0.69 s) 75 (2.7 s) 2.4e-17 2.4e-17 0.0 297
(b) error-driven reduction
Error Exact Traffic
ǫ |AAPPmal| |A
′
mal| bound error error
0.08 3 3 0.0724 0.0724 0.0720
0.07 4 4 0.0700 0.0700 0.0683
0.04 35 32 0.0267 0.0212 0.0036
0.02 36 33 0.0105 0.0096 0.0032
0.001 41 38 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003
1e-04 47 41 7.7e-05 7.7e-05 1.2e-05
1e-05 51 47 6.6e-06 6.6e-06 0.0
Exact error contains the values of dPHTTP (A,A
′) that we computed after the reduc-
tion in order to evaluate the precision of the result given in Error bound. The
computation of this value is very expensive (time(Exact)) since it inherently re-
quires determinisation of the whole automaton A. We do not provide it in Table 3
(presenting the results for the automaton Abd with 1,352 states) because the deter-
minisation ran out of memory (the step is not required in the reduction process).
Traffic error shows the error that we obtained when comparedA′ with A on an HTTP
traffic sample, in particular the ratio of packets misclassified byA′ to the total num-
ber of packets in the sample (242,468). Comparing Exact error with Traffic error
gives us a feedback about the fidelity of the traffic model PHTTP . We note that
there are no guarantees on the relationship between Exact error and Traffic error.
LUTs is the number of LUTs consumed byA′ when synthesized into the FPGA. Hard-
ware synthesis is a costly step so we provide this value only for selected NFAs.
Approximation errors
Table 2: Results for the http-attacks regex,
size-driven reduction, |Aatt| = 142, |AREDatt | =
112, time(REDUCE) = 7.9 s, time(label2sl) =
28.3min, time(Exact) = 14.0–16.4min.
Error Exact Traffic
k |AAPP
att
| |A′
att
| bound error error
0.1 11 (1.1s) 5 (0.4s) 1.0 0.9972 0.9957
0.2 22 (1.1s) 14 (0.6s) 1.0 0.8341 0.2313
0.3 33 (1.1s) 24 (0.7s) 0.081 0.0770 0.0067
0.4 44 (1.1s) 37 (1.6s) 0.0005 0.0005 0.0010
0.5 56 (1.1s) 49 (1.2s) 3.3e-06 3.3-06 0.0010
0.6 67 (1.1s) 61 (1.9s) 1.2e-09 1.2e-09 8.7e-05
0.7 78 (1.1s) 72 (2.4s) 4.8e-12 4.8e-12 1.2e-05
0.9 100 (1.1s) 93 (4.7s) 3.7e-16 1.1e-15 0.0
Table 1 presents the results of
the self-loop reduction for the
NFA Amal describing regexes
fromhttp-malicious.We can
observe that the differences be-
tween the upper bounds on the
probabilistic distance and its real
value are negligible (typically in
the order of 10−4 or less). We can
also see that the probabilistic dis-
tance agrees with the traffic error.
This indicates a good quality of the
traffic model employed in the re-
duction process. Further, we can see that our approach can provide useful trade-offs
between the reduction error and the reduction factor. Finally, Table 1b shows that a sig-
nificant reduction is obtained when the error threshold ǫ is increased from 0.04 to 0.07.
Table 2 presents the results of the size-driven self-loop reduction for NFA Aatt de-
scribing http-attacks regexes. We can observe that the error bounds provide again
a very good approximation of the real probabilistic distance. On the other hand, the dif-
ference between the probabilistic distance and the traffic error is larger than for Amal.
Since all experiments use the same probabilistic automaton and the same traffic, this
discrepancy is accounted to the different set of packets that are incorrectly accepted
by AREDatt . If the probability of these packets is adequately captured in the traffic model,
the difference between the distance and the traffic error is small and vice versa. This
also explains an even larger difference in Table 3 (presenting the results for Abd con-
structed from http-backdoor regexes) for k ∈ 〈0.2, 0.4〉. Here, the traffic error is
very small and caused by a small set of packets (approx. 70), whose probability is not
correctly captured in the traffic model. Despite this problem, the results clearly show
that our approach still provides significant reductions while keeping the traffic error
small: about a 5-fold reduction is obtained for the traffic error 0.03% and a 10-fold
reduction is obtained for the traffic error 6.3%. We discuss the practical impact of such
a reduction in §5.3.
Performance of the approximate reduction
Table 3: Results for http-backdoor, size-
driven reduction, |Abd| = 1, 352, time(label
2
sl ) =
19.9min, LUTs(AREDbd ) = 2, 266.
Error Traffic
k |AAPP
bd
| |A′
bd
| bound error LUTs
0.1 135 (1.2m) 8 (2.6 s) 1.0 0.997 202
0.2 270 (1.2m) 111 (5.2 s) 0.0012 0.0631 579
0.3 405 (1.2m) 233 (9.8 s) 3.4e-08 0.0003 894
0.4 540 (1.3m) 351 (21.7 s) 1.0e-12 0.0003 1063
0.5 676 (1.3m) 473 (41.8 s) 1.2e-17 0.0 1249
0.7 946 (1.4m) 739 (2.1m) 8.3e-30 0.0 1735
0.9 1216 (1.5m) 983 (5.6m) 1.3e-52 0.0 2033
In all our experiments (Tables 1–
3), we can observe that the most
time-consuming step of the reduc-
tion process is the computation of
state labellings (it takes at least
90% of the total time). The cru-
cial observation is that the struc-
ture of the NFAs fundamentally af-
fects the performance of this step.
Although after REDUCE, the size
of Amal is very similar to the size
ofAatt, computing label
2
sl takes more time (28.3min vs. 38.7 s). The key reason behind
this slowdown is the determinisation (or alternatively disambiguation) process required
by the product construction underlying the state labelling computation (cf. §4.4). For
Aatt, the process results in a significantly larger product when compared to the product
for Amal. The size of the product directly determines the time and space complexity of
solving the linear equation system required for computing the state labelling.
As explained in §4, the computation of the state labelling label2sl can exploit the
“tentacle” structure of the NFAs appearing in NIDSes and thus can be done component-
wise. On the other hand, our experiments reveal that the use of REDUCE typically
breaks this structure and thus the component-wise computation cannot be effectively
used. For the NFA Amal, this behaviour does not have any major performance impact
as the determinisation leads to a moderate-sized automaton and the state labelling com-
putation takes less than 40 s. On the other hand, this behaviour has a dramatic effect
for the NFA Aatt. By disabling the initial application of REDUCE and thus preserv-
ing the original structure of Aatt, we were able to speed up the state label computation
from 28.3min to 1.5min. Note that other steps of the approximate reduction took a sim-
ilar time as before disabling REDUCE and also that the trade-offs between the error and
the reduction factor were similar. Surprisingly, disabling REDUCE caused that the com-
putation of the exact probabilistic distance became computationally infeasible because
the determinisation ran out of memory.
Due to the size of the NFA Abd, the impact of disabling the initial application of
REDUCE is even more fundamental. In particular, computing the state labelling took
only 19.9min, in contrast to running out of memory when the REDUCE is applied in
the first step (therefore, the input automaton is not processed by REDUCE in Table 3;
we still give the number of LUTs of its reduced version for comparison, though). Note
that the size of Abd also slows down other reduction steps (the greedy algorithm and
the final REDUCE reduction). We can, however, clearly see that computing the state
labelling is still the most time-consuming step.
5.3 The Real Impact in an FPGA-Accelerated NIDS
Further, we also evaluated some of the obtained automata in the setting of [5] imple-
menting a high-speed NIDS pre-filter. In that setting, the amount of resources avail-
able for the regex matching engine is 15,000 LUTs5 and the frequency of the engine
is 200MHz. We synthesized NFAs that use a 32-bit-wide data path, corresponding to
processing 4 ASCII characters at once, which is—according to the analysis in [5]—the
best trade-off between the utilization of the chip resources and the maximum achievable
frequency. A simple analysis shows that the throughput of one automaton is 6.4Gbps,
so in order to reach the desired link speed of 100Gbps, 16 units are required, and
63 units are needed to handle 400Gbps. With the given amount of LUTs, we are there-
fore bounded by 937 LUTs for 100Gbps and 238 LUTs for 400Gbps.
We focused on the consumption of LUTs by an implementation of the regex match-
ing engines for http-backdoor (AREDbd ) and http-malicious (A
RED
mal).
– 100Gbps: For this speed, AREDmal can be used without any approximate reduction as
it is small enough to fit in the available space. On the other hand, AREDbd without
the approximate reduction is way too large to fit (at most 6 units fit inside the
available space, yielding the throughput of only 38.4Gbps, which is unacceptable).
The columnLUTs in Table 3 shows that using our framework, we are able to reduce
AREDbd such that it uses 894 LUTs (for k = 0.3), and so all the needed 16 units fit into
the FPGA, yielding the throughput over 100Gbps and the theoretical error bound
of a false positive ≤ 3.4× 10−8 wrt the model PHTTP .
– 400Gbps: Regex matching at this speed is extremely challenging. The only re-
duced version ofAREDbd that fits in the available space is the one for the value k = 0.1
with the error bound almost 1. The situation is better for AREDmal . In the exact ver-
sion, at most 39 units can fit inside the FPGA with the maximum throughput of
249.6Gbps. On the other hand, when using our approximate reduction framework,
we are able to place 63 units into the FPGA, each of the size 224 LUTs (k = 0.6)
5 We omit the analysis of flip-flop consumption because in our setting it is dominated by the
LUT consumption.
with the throughput over 400Gbps and the theoretical error bound of a false posi-
tive ≤ 8.7× 10−8 wrt the model PHTTP .
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a novel approach for approximate reduction of NFAs used in network
traffic filtering. Our approach is based on a proposal of a probabilistic distance of the
original and reduced automaton using a probabilistic model of the input network traffic,
which characterizes the significance of particular packets. We characterized the com-
putational complexity of approximate reductions based on the described distance and
proposed a sequence of heuristics allowing one to perform the approximate reduction in
an efficient way. Our experimental results are quite encouraging and show that we can
often achieve a very significant reduction for a negligible loss of precision. We showed
that using our approach, FPGA-accelerated network filtering on large traffic speeds can
be applied on regexes of malicious traffic where it could not be applied before.
In the future, we plan to investigate other approximate reductions of the NFAs,
maybe using some variant of abstraction from abstract regular model checking [44],
adapted for the given probabilistic setting. Another important issue for the future is to
develop better ways of learning a suitable probabilistic model of the input traffic.
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A Proofs of Lemmas
Some of the proofs use the PA PExp defined as PExp =
(
1, [µ], {[µ]a}a∈Σ
)
where
µ = 1|Σ|+1 . PExp models an exponential distribution over the words fromΣ
∗ (wrt their
length). In particular, PExp assigns every word w ∈ Σ∗ the probability PrPExp (w) =
µ|w|+1. We use PExp to assign every word overΣ a non-zero probability; any other PA
with the same property would work as well.
Lemma 1. Let P be a PA and A an NFA. The problem of computing PrP (L(A)) is
PSPACE-complete. For a UFA A, PrP (L(A)) can be computed in PTIME.
Proof. We prove the first and the second part of the lemma independently.
1. Computing PrP (L(A)) is PSPACE-complete for an NFA A. The membership in
PSPACE can be shown as follows. The computation described at the end of §3.1
corresponds to solving a linear equation system. The system has an exponential size
because of the blowup caused by the determinisation/disambiguation ofA required
by the product construction. The equation system can, however, be constructed by
a PSPACE transducer Meq . Moreover, as solving linear equation systems can be
done using a polylogarithmic-space transducer MSysLin , one can combine these
two transducers to obtain a PSPACE algorithm. Details of the construction follow:
– First, we construct a transducerMeq that, given an NFAA = (QA, δA, IA, FA)
and a PA P = (α,γ, {∆a}a∈Σ) on its input, constructs a system of m =
2|QA| · |Q[P ]| linear equations S(A,P ) of m unknowns ξ[R,p] for R ⊆ QA
and p ∈ Q[P ] representing the product of A′ and P , where A′ is a determin-
istic automaton obtained from A using the standard subset construction. The
system S(A,P ) is defined as follows (cf. [37]):
ξ[R,p] =


0 if LA(R) ∩ LP ′(p) = ∅,∑
a∈Σ
∑
p′∈Q[P ]
(∆a[p, p
′] · ξ[δA(R,a),p′]) + γ[p] if R ∩ FA 6= ∅,∑
a∈Σ
∑
p′∈Q[P ]
∆a[p, p
′] · ξ[δA(R,a),p′] otherwise,
such that P ′ = supp(P ) and δA(R, a) =
⋃
r∈R δ(r, a). The test LA(R) ∩
LP ′(p) = ∅ can be performed as testing ∃ri ∈ R : LA(r) ∩ LP ′(p) = ∅,
which can be done in polynomial time.
It holds thatPrP (L(A)) =
∑
p∈Q[P ]α[p]·ξ[IA,p]. Although the size of S(A,P )
(which is the output ofMeq) is exponential to the size of the input ofMeq , the
internal configuration of Meq only needs to be of polynomial size, i.e., Meq
works in PSPACE. Note that the size of each equation is at most polynomial.
– Given a system S ofm linear equations ofm unknowns, solving S can be done
in the time O(log2m) using O(mk) number of processors for a fixed k [45,
Corollary 2] (i.e., it is in the class NC).6
6 We use log k to denote the base-2 logarithm of k.
– According to [46, Lemma 1b], aO(log2m) time-bounded parallel machine can
be simulated by a O(log4m) space-bounded Turing machine. Therefore, there
exists a O(log4m) space-bounded Turing machineMSysLin solving a system
ofm linear equations ofm unknowns.
– As a consequence,MSysLin can solve S(A,P ) using the spaceO(log
4(2|QA| ·
|Q[P ]|)) = O(log4 2|QA| + log4 |Q[P ]|)) = O(|QA|4 + log
4 |Q[P ]|)).
– The missing part is how to combine Meq and MSysLin to avoid using the
exponential-size output tape of Meq . For this, we use the following standard
technique [47, Proposition 8.2].
We start simulating MSysLin . When MSysLin moves its head right, we pause
it and start simulating Meq until it outputs the corresponding bit, which is di-
rectly fed into the input of MSysLin . Then we pause Meq and resume the run
ofMSysLin . We use a binary counter to keep the track of the position k of the
head ofMSysLin on the tape. When MSysLin moves the head right, we incre-
ment the value of the counter to k+1 and letMeq run until it produces another
bit of the tape, when MSysLin moves the head left, we decrement the value
of the counter to k − 1, restart Meq , and let it run until it has produced the
(k − 1)-st bit of the tape.
The internal configuration of both Meq and MSysLin is of a polynomial size
and the overhead of keeping track of the position of the head of MSysLin
also requires only polynomial space. Therefore, the whole transducer runs in
a polynomially-bounded space.
The PSPACE-hardness is obtained by a reduction from the (PSPACE-complete)
universality of NFAs: using the PA PExp defined above, it holds that L(A) = Σ
∗
iff PrPExp (L(A)) = 1.
2. Computing PrP (L(A)) is in PTIME if A is a UFA.We modify the proof from [37]
into our setting. First, we formally define the product of a PA P = (α,γ, {∆a}a∈Σ)
and an NFA A = (Q, δ, I, F ), denoted P ⊕A, as the (|Q[P ]| · |Q|)-state PPA
R = (αR,γR, {∆
R
a }a∈Σ) where
7
αR[(qP , qA)] = αR[qP ] · |{qA} ∩ I|, γR[(qP , qA)] = γR[qP ] · |{qA} ∩ F |,
∆Ra [(qP , qA), (q
′
P , q
′
A)] =∆a[qP , q
′
P ] · |{q
′
A} ∩ δ(qA, a)|.
Note that R is not necessarily a PA any more because for w ∈ Σ∗ such that
PrP (w) > 0, (i) if w /∈ L(A), then PrR(w) = 0 and (ii) if w ∈ L(A) and A can
accept w using n different runs, then PrR(w) = n · PrP (w). As a consequence,
the probabilities of all words from Σ∗ are no longer guaranteed to add up to 1. If
A is unambiguous, the second issue is avoided and R preserves the probabilities of
words from L(A), i.e., PrR(w) = PrP (w) for all w ∈ L(A), so R can be seen as
the restriction of PrP to L(A). We assume R is trimmed.
In order to compute PrP (L(A)), we construct a matrix E defined as
∑
a∈Σ∆
R
a .
Note that ρ(E) < 1, where ρ(E) is the spectral radius ofE. Intuitively, ρ(E) < 1
holds because we trimmed the redundant states from the product of P and A, the
7 we assume an implicit bijection between states of the product R and {1, . . . , |Q[R]|}
significance of paths between two nodes of length n for n → ∞ is 0 (for a full
proof see [37]). We further use the following standard result in linear algebra: if
ρ(E) < 1, then (i) the matrix I −E is invertible and (ii) the sum of powers of E,
denoted as E∗, can be computed as E∗ =
∑∞
i=0E
i = (I −E)−1 [48] (note that
matrix inversion can be done in polynomial time [49]).
E∗ represents the reachability between nodes of R, i.e., E∗[r, r′] is the sum of
significances of all (possibly infinitely many) paths from r to r′ in R. When related
to P and A, the matrixE∗ represents the reachability in P wrt L(A), in particular,
E∗[(qP , qA), (q
′
P , q
′
A)] =
∑{
∆w[qP , q
′
P ]
∣∣∣ qA w q′A, w ∈ Σ∗} . (1)
We prove Equation (1) using the following reasoning. First, we show that
En[(qP , qA), (q
′
P , q
′
A)] =
∑{
∆w[qP , q
′
P ]
∣∣∣ qA w q′A, w ∈ Σn} , (2)
i.e., En represents the reachability in P wrt L(A) for words of length n. We prove
Equation (2) by induction on n: for n = 0 and n = 1 the equation follows directly
from the definition of R and∆. Next, suppose that (2) holds for n > 1; we show
that it holds also for n+ 1. We start with the following reasoning:
En+1[(qP , qA), (q
′
P , q
′
A)]
= (EnE)[(qP , qA), (q
′
P , q
′
A)]
=
∑{
En[(qP , qA), (q
′′
P , q
′′
A)] ·E[(q
′′
P , q
′′
A), (q
′
P , q
′
A)]
∣∣∣ (q′′P , q′′A) ∈ Q[R]}.
Note that the last line is obtained via definition of matrix multiplication. Further,
using the induction hypothesis, we get
En+1[(qP , qA), (q
′
P , q
′
A)]
=
∑{∑{
∆w[qP , q
′′
P ]
∣∣∣ qA w q′′A, w ∈ Σn} ·
·
∑{
∆a[q
′′
P , q
′
P ]
∣∣∣ q′′A a−→ q′A, a ∈ Σ}
∣∣∣∣∣ (q′′P , q′′A) ∈ Q[R]
}
=
∑{∑{
∆w[qP , q
′′
P ] ·∆a[q
′′
P , q
′
P ]
∣∣∣ qA w q′′A, q′′A a−→ q′A,
a ∈ Σ,w ∈ Σn
} ∣∣∣∣∣ (q′′P , q′′A) ∈ Q[R]
}
=
∑{
∆w′ [qP , q
′
P ]
∣∣∣ qA w′ q′A, w′ ∈ Σn+1}.
Since E∗ =
∑∞
i=0E
i, Equation (1) follows. Using the matrix E∗, it remains to
compute PrP (L(A)) as
PrP (L(A)) = α
⊤
R ·E
∗ · γR.
⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Consider an NFA A, a PA P , a bound on the number of states n ∈ N, and
an error bound ǫ ∈ 〈0, 1〉. It is PSPACE-complete to determine whether there exists
an NFA A′ with n states s.t. dP (A,A
′) ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Membership in PSPACE: We non-deterministically generate an automaton A′
with n states and test (in PSPACE, as shown in Lemma 1) that dP (A,A
′) ≤ ǫ. This
shows the problem is in NPSPACE = PSPACE.
PSPACE-hardness: We use a reduction from the problem of checking universality
of an NFA A = (Q, δ, I, F ) over Σ, i.e., from checking whether L(A) = Σ∗, which
is PSPACE-complete. First, for a reason that will become clear below, we test whether
A accepts all words over Σ of length 0 and 1, which can be done in polynomial time.
We can now show that L(A) = Σ∗ iff there is a 1-state NFA A′ s.t. dPExp (A,A
′) ≤ 0
where PExp is as defined at the beginning of Appendix. The implication from left to
right is clear: such an NFA can only be (up to isomorphism) the NFA A′ = ({q}, {q
a
−→
q | a ∈ Σ}, {q}, {q})). To show the reverse implication, we note that we have tested
that {ǫ} ∪ Σ ⊆ L(A). Since the probability of any word from {ǫ} ∪ Σ ⊆ L(A) in
PExp is non-zero, the only 1-state NFA that processes those words with zero error is
the NFA A′ defined above. Because the language of A′ is L(A′) = Σ∗, it holds that
dPExp (A,A
′) ≤ 0 iff L(A) = Σ∗. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. Consider an NFA A, a PA P , a bound on the number of states n ∈ N, and
an error bound ǫ ∈ 〈0, 1〉. It is PSPACE-complete to determine whether there exists
a subset of states R ⊆ Q[A] of the size |R| = n such that dP (A,A|R) ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Membership in PSPACE: We non-deterministically generate a subsetR ofQ[A]
having n states and test (in PSPACE, as shown in Lemma 1) that dP (A,A|R) ≤ ǫ. This
shows the problem is in NPSPACE = PSPACE.
PSPACE-hardness: We reduce from the PSPACE-complete problem of checking
universality of an NFA A = (Q, δ, I, F ) over Σ. Consider a symbol x /∈ Σ. Let us
construct an NFA A′ overΣ ∪ {x} s.t. L(A′) = x∗.L(A). A′ is constructed by adding
a fresh state qnew to A that can loop over x and make a transition to any initial state
of A over x: A′ = (Q⊎{qnew}, δ ∪ {qnew
x
−→ q | q ∈ I ∪ {qnew}}, I ∪ {qnew}, F ).
We set n = |A′|+ 1. Further, we also construct an (n+ 1)-state NFA B accepting the
language xn.Σ∗ defined as B = (QB, δB, {q1}, {qn+1}) whereQB = {q1, . . . , qn+1}
and δB = {qi
x
−→ qi+1 | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {qn+1
a
−→ qn+1 | a ∈ Σ}. Moreover, let P be
a PA representing a distribution PrP that is defined for each w ∈ (Σ ∪ {x})∗ as
PrP (w) =
{
µ|w
′|+1 for w = xn.w′, w′ ∈ Σ∗, and µ = 1|Σ|+1 ,
0 otherwise.
(3)
Note that PrP (x
n.w) = PrPExp (w) for w ∈ Σ
∗ and PrP (u) = 0 for u /∈ xn.Σ∗ (P
can be easily constructed from PExp). Also note that B accepts exactly those word w
such that PrP (w) 6= 0 and that PrP (L(B)) = 1. Using the automata defined above, we
construct an NFA C = A′ ∪B where the union of two NFAs is defined as A1 ∪ A2 =
(Q[A1]⊎Q[A2], δ[A1]⊎ δ[A2], I[A1]⊎ I[A2], F [A1]⊎F [A2]). The language of C is
L(C) = x∗.L(A) ∪ xn.Σ∗ and its probability is PrP (L(C)) = 1.
The important property ofC is that if there exists a setR ⊆ Q[C] of the size |R| = n
s.t. dP (C,C|R) ≤ 0, then L(A) = Σ
∗. The property holds because since |Q[A′]| =
n−1, when we removen states fromC, at least one state fromQ[B] is removed,making
the whole subautomaton of C corresponding to B useless, and, therefore, L(C|R) ⊆
x∗.L(A). Because dP (C,C|R) ≤ 0, we know that PrP (L(C|R)) = 1, so x
n.Σ∗ ⊆
x∗.L(A) = L(C|R) and, therefore,L(A) = Σ
∗. For the other direction, if L(A) = Σ∗,
then there exists a set R ⊆ Q[A′] ∪ Q[B] of the size |R| = n s.t. dP (C,C|R) ≤ 0 (in
particular,R can be such that R ⊆ Q[B]). ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. For every x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the functions reducep, errorp, and label
x
p sat-
isfy C1. Moreover, consider an NFA A, a PA P , and let ℓxp = label
x
p(A,P ) for x ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Then, for each q ∈ Q[A], we have ℓ1p(q) ≥ ℓ
2
p(q) ≥ ℓ
3
p(q).
Proof. First (since we will use it in the proof of the first part), for each q ∈ Q[A] we
prove the inequalities ℓ1p(q) ≥ ℓ
2
p(q) ≥ ℓ
3
p(q). The first inequality follows from the fact
that if the banguages of reachable final states are not disjoint, in the case of ℓ1p we may
sum probabilities of the same words multiple times. The second inequality follows from
the inclusion L♭A(q).LA(q) ⊆ L
♭
A(F ∩ reach(q)).
Second, we prove that the functions reducep, errorp, and label
x
p satisfy the proper-
ties of C1:
– C1(a): To show that errorp(A, V, label
x
p(A,P )) ≥ dP (A, reducep(A, V )), we
prove that the inequality holds for ℓ3p = label
3
p(A,P ); the rest follows from ℓ
1
p(q) ≥
ℓ2p(q) ≥ ℓ
3
p(q) proved above.
Consider some set of states V ⊆ Q[A] and the set V ′ ∈ ⌊V ⌋p s.t. for any V ′′ ∈
⌊V ⌋p, it holds that
∑
{ℓ3p(q) | q ∈ V
′} ≤
∑
{ℓ3p(q) | q ∈ V
′′}. We have
L(A)△L(reducep(A, V ))
= L(A)△L(reducep(A, V
′)) {def. of ⊑p}
= L(A) \ L(reducep(A, V
′)) {L(A) ⊇ L(reducep(A, V ′))}
⊆
⋃
q∈V ′
L♭A(q).LA(q). {def. of reducep}
(4)
Finally, using (4), we obtain
dP (A,reducep(A, V ))
= PrP (L(A) \ L(reducep(A, V
′)))
{def. of dP and L(A) ⊇ L(reducep(A, V ′))}
≤
∑
q∈V ′
PrP (L
♭
A(q).LA(q)) {(4)}
=
∑
{ℓ3p(q) | q ∈ V
′} {def. of ℓ3p}
= min
V ′′∈⌊V ⌋p
∑
{ℓ3p(q) | q ∈ V
′′} {def. of V ′}
= errorp(A, V, ℓ
3
p). {def. of errorp}
(5)
– C1(b): |reducep(A,Q[A])| ≤ 1 because |reducep(A,Q[A])| = |trim(A|∅)| = 0.
– C1(c): reducep(A, ∅) = A since reducep(A, ∅) = trim(A|Q[A]) = A (we assume
that A is trimmed at the input). ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. Consider an NFA A, a PA P , a bound on the number of states n ∈ N, and
an error bound ǫ ∈ 〈0, 1〉. It is PSPACE-complete to determine whether there exists
a subset of states R ⊆ Q[A] of the size |R| = n such that dP (A, sl(A,R)) ≤ ǫ.
Proof. Membership in PSPACE can be proved in the same way as in the proof of
Lemma 5.
PSPACE-hardness: We reduce from the PSPACE-complete problem of checking
universality of an NFA A = (Q, δ, I, F ). First, we check whether I[A] 6= ∅. We have
that L(A) = Σ∗ iff there exists a set of states R ⊆ Q of the size |R| = |Q| such that
dPExp (A, sl(A,R)) ≤ 0 (note that this means that a self-loop is added to every state
of A). ⊓⊔
Lemma 8. For every x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the functions reducesl , error sl , and label
x
sl sat-
isfy C1. Moreover, consider an NFA A, a PA P , and let ℓxsl = label
x
sl (A,P ) for x ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Then, for each q ∈ Q[A], we have ℓ1sl(q) ≥ ℓ
2
sl(q) ≥ ℓ
3
sl (q).
Proof. First, because we use them in the proof of the first part, for each q ∈ Q[A] we
prove the inequalities ℓ1sl (q) ≥ ℓ
2
sl(q) ≥ ℓ
3
sl(q). We start with the equalityweightP (w) =
PrP (w.Σ
∗) and obtain the equality∑
w∈L♭A(q)
weightP (w) =
∑
w∈L♭A(q)
PrP (w.Σ
∗), (6)
which, in turn, implies ℓ1sl = weightP (L
♭
A(q)) ≥ PrP
(
L♭A(q).Σ
∗
)
= ℓ2sl . The previous
holds because if, e.g., L♭A(q) = {w,wa} for w ∈ Σ
∗ and a ∈ Σ, then
weightP (L
♭
A(q)) = weightP ({w,wa}) = weightP (w) + weightP (wa),
while
PrP
(
L♭A(q).Σ
∗
)
= PrP ({w,wa}.Σ
∗) = PrP (w.Σ
∗) .
The inequality ℓ2sl ≥ ℓ
3
sl holds trivially.
Second, we prove that the functions reducesl , error sl , and label
x
sl satisfy the prop-
erties of C1:
– C1(a): To show that error sl (A, V, label
x
sl (A,P )) ≥ dP (A, reducesl(A, V )), we
prove that the inequality holds for ℓ3sl = label
3
sl (A,P ); the rest follows from
ℓ1sl (q) ≥ ℓ
2
sl(q) ≥ ℓ
3
sl(q) proved above.
Consider some set of states V ⊆ Q[A] and the set V ′ = min(⌊V ⌋sl ). We can
estimate the symmetric difference of the languages of the original and the reduced
automaton as
L(A)△L(reducesl(A, V ))
= L(A)△L(reducesl (A, V
′)) {def. of ⊑sl}
= L(reducesl(A, V
′)) \ L(A) {L(A) ⊆ L(reducesl (A, V ′))}
⊆
⋃
q∈V ′
L♭A(q).Σ
∗ \
⋃
q∈V ′
L♭A(q).LA(q). {def. of reducesl}
(7)
The last inclusion holds because sl(A, V ) adds self-loops to the states in V , so the
newly accepted words are for sure those that traverse through V , and they are for
sure not those that could be accepted by going through V before the reduction (but
they could be accepted without touching V , hence the inclusion). We can estimate
the probabilistic distance of A and reducesl(A, V ) as
dP (A,reducesl (A, V ))
≤ PrP
( ⋃
q∈V ′
L♭A(q).Σ
∗ \
⋃
q∈V ′
L♭A(q).LA(q)
)
{(7)}
= PrP
( ⋃
q∈V ′
L♭A(q).Σ
∗
)
− PrP
( ⋃
q∈V ′
L♭A(q).LA(q)
)
{property of Pr}
≤
∑
q∈V ′
PrP
(
L♭A(q).Σ
∗
)
−
∑
q∈V ′
PrP
(
L♭A(q).LA(q)
)
{property of Pr and the fact that L♭A(q).Σ
∗ ⊆ L♭A(q).LA(q)}
=
∑
q∈V ′
(
PrP
(
L♭A(q).Σ
∗
)
− PrP
(
L♭A(q).LA(q)
))
=
∑
q∈V ′
(
PrP
(
L♭A(q).Σ
∗
)
− PrP
(
L♭A(q).LA(q)
))
=
∑
{ℓ3sl(q) | q ∈ min(⌊V ⌋sl )}
{def. of ℓ3sl and V
′}
= error sl (A, V, ℓ
3
sl ).
(8)
– C1(b): |reducesl (A,Q[A])| ≤ 1 because, from the definition, |reducesl(A,Q[A])| =
|trim(sl(A,Q)[A])| = 1.
– C1(c): reducesl(A, ∅) = A since reducesl (A, ∅) = trim(sl(A, ∅)) = A (we as-
sume that A is trimmed at the input). ⊓⊔
